Croatia Enters the EU: Wrong Timing, But Still a Chance

The financial, economic and political crisis of the European Union continues, coupled with a rise of Euroscepticism and lack of faith in the EU project. On the other hand, Croatia is preparing to hold a referendum which should make it the 28th member state of the European Union. In this month’s report we bring you a critical view of Croatia’s EU accession in the midst of a deep crisis of the EU.

Croatia Enters the EU: Wrong Timing, But Still a Chance

During the Portuguese presidency of the Council of the European Union in March 2000 the Lisbon Strategy was launched as a current goal for the European Union to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion until 2010. Despite widespread economic growth at those times (3.8% GDP growth in EU15), which was actually not seen during the last 15 years, there was moderate scepticism concerning coming years in the EU. This strategic concept was adopted for future sustainability of European integration (including the coming Eastern enlargement), as well as an effort of pushing a position of the EU into one of the most important geopolitical players in the world. Nevertheless, 10 years after, Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt admitted that this strategy was just a failure. Greece is balancing on the edge of economic survival, while other countries are nervously hovering in the field of uncertainty with unknown future. Instead of economic growth and better job accessibility, as one of the most significant targets, we are witnessing civil unrest against oligarchic leaders and the worst situation on the labor market for under 25-year-olds in the last few decades. Of course, this negative trend seems to be extended worldwide and narrowly connected with the financial and debt crisis, but the EU obviously did not accomplish its intention mentioned above. This wrong concept has been newly reassessed by quite a hidden strategy called Europe 2020. This policy paper does not aim to uncover the future geopolitical position of the EU according to this new strategy or even try to resolve deep economical and political obstacles. It is rather focused on the contemporary crisis of confidence across all member states on the example of Hungarian presidency of the Council of the EU in the period when a modest, but really important success is expected, among all those negative scenarios – Croatia’s accession to the European Union.

Current imbalance of the European Union: only a debt crisis?

“A Strong Europe” was an ambitious motto of the preceding EU presidency led by Hungary as the third post-communist country in the first half of 2011. As a consequence of crushing victory of Viktor Orbán’s party FIDESZ one year earlier, no useless political clashes between the government and opposition, what basically happened during the Czech presidency in 2009 or during the non-existing legal government during Belgium’s leadership a year later were expected. Optimistic expectations were unfortunately forgotten, due to the media law controversy. Instead of complimentary speeches, Orbán was roughly criticized for curbing press freedom, which threatened at the beginning of his presidency. For accessing countries such as Croatia or Serbia, fully affected by such undemocratic actions in the 1990ies, these obstructions are not an honest example how to approach a real and well-working democracy.

This inconvenience was nevertheless a rather comical reminder that constitutional majority in a parliamentary democracy can still be a dangerous symptom for state orientation, especially in the Hungarian case as a young democracy. Other circumstances, even more important for the current (im)balance of the EU, soon occurred.

Growth and employment

Although the EU presidency does not have such a powerful influence in the post-Lisbon era it is still important for coordination of national interests and foreign presentation within the European family. No less courageous, like the motto of Hungarian presidency, were also the presented priorities of that semester.

Growth and employment for preservation of the European social model were the first goals of the Hungarian leadership. It would be daring to assert that a half year holding of the European seat brings fundamental changes in this complicated policy. However, due to the Eurozone debt crisis, the principal issues of this policy were pushed aside and Viktor Orbán was hidden in background of the “strong” couple Merkel-Sarkozy. On the other hand it can be stated that Hungary is not yet a member of the Eurozone. Yes, that is correct, but this behavior of the political union does not certify political unity like the European Union does at present. This inappropriate manner was also visible during the sudden summit in Paris about the Libyan civil war in March when NATO bombing started. Where was Viktor Orbán’s voice as the highest representative of the presidency? On the phone? Some kind of unfairness between member states (EU15 vs. EU27; big vs. small states) is a long-term issue at the European political scene, but this circumventing is rather a confirmation of inter-European imbalance than political unity.

The unemployment rate finally stayed on the same level in the EU during the first half of this year and did not change despite the proclaimed target of the presidency. On the contrary, it increased in all threatened countries (Greece, Spain, Ireland) and foundations of the social model were shaken by the “M 15 movement”, started in Spain where every second youth does not have a job. Meanwhile, the overall EU unemployment rate has basically remained steady (9.5%),while in Croatia it is regrettably increasing. Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect that this trend is going to change soon due to structural problems in Croatia, insufficient approach in the field of innovations and significant economical links with the Eurozone, which does not really know what tomorrow brings.

The EU economy is currently decreasing. A few numbers: Since 2008 euro lost 31% compared to Japanese yen, 12% compared to Chinese yuan, 24% compared to Swiss frank and 23% compared to Australian dollar. The GDP growth of Norway was almost twice as high and Turkey’s even three times higher.

Enlargement

The Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy has, not surprisingly, become one of the most important tasks as well. Indisputable success was accomplished by closing the Croatian negotiations in late June, but it would be foolish to use it as a proof of successful Hungarian leadership. Its society is the second most proactive for future enlargement (64% of Hungarians are in favor), but Viktor Orbán did not visit Western Balkans countries so often during these six months. This is not really a confirmation of deep Hungarian interest, with unprecedented societal support for this policy. In this case we consider historical and cultural proximity of Hungary towards Western Balkan countries, so this seems like an error, but not of the EU enlargement policy, but rather the Hungarian foreign policy. The successful end of Croatian negotiations cannot be attributed to Hungary, a country which was not able to open at least one new chapter with another candidate country – Turkey. “It is an objective to maintain the current pace of accession negotiations with Turkey“ were Hungarian words at the beginning of the year, but reality is totally different. According to the annual enlargement report of the European Commission announced in October 2011, Turkey’s accession negotiations are basically stuck, because not a single new chapter was opened for more than a year.

These facts could be understood as a pacifistic step back created by the EU due to the coming presidency of Cyprus next year. Turkey has threatened that it will totally block all relations with the EU in the case that “our” Cyprus will really hold “their” EU seat. The presumption of the EU coming back to reality has, of course, another side of the coin – the EU side. It is also an illustration of a completely divided European Union in relation to the enlargement as such. The most optimistic country is Poland with 67% promotion of population, on the other side is Germany and 22% of support, especially in the Turkish case. Due to this it would not be fair to criticize only Budapest’s incompetence, but it is rather a confirmation of a divided common approach to Turkey’s future in Europe and also the incapability of a constructive foreign policy of the EU in general. Concerning the unpredictable CFSP and especially thee unknown Eurozone’s future, after Croatia’s accession, any future enlargement seems like one big illusion now. But on the other hand, could Croatia gain an opportunity and also influence in the EU by kick-starting a new enlargement effort? This could lead to breaking of this illusion in the future, as discussed bellow.

The Hungarian failure was, unfortunately, visible in another “foreign area” – European Neighborhood Policy. One of the most expected EU goals was the organization of a summit of the Eastern Partnership during the Hungarian leadership. Nevertheless, this event was postponed due to unexpected events, officially, because the G8 summit was held at the same time. It is understandable that the EU gave way to the resolution about the deepening Eurozone crisis, but it also confirmed a marginalizing of less important policies such as the Eastern Partnership. This fact was not changed during the final Eastern Partnership summit, held in Poland, instead of Hungary, in September. This meeting was accompanied by the inability to find an agreement about the common approach to neighborhood countries in the case of the autocratic regime in Belarus. The fiasco showed another inability to move optimistically toward mutual relations with Eastern European countries. It seems that the process of association and “Europeanization” is being pushed. The question is - how far?

It is logical that Eastern countries of the EU should hold a flag in this specific area, but Hungary is able to spread its relations only in connection to their minorities in Eastern countries, especially with Ukraine. Baltic states are preoccupied with their “resolved” relations with Russia and while Slovakia is too weak for this, Bulgaria and Romania seem to be incompetent to come up with an appropriate and progressive approach. Poland has the capacity as well as the tension to move mutual contacts (especially with Russia) in a correct way, but has to get rid of the often government rotation. This was probably changed after Tusk’s victory at the last election held in October 2011.

Croatia’s EU accession and expectations

Croatia closed the last four negotiation chapters after more than 5 years of negotiations. Croatia is the only one Western Balkans country which fully (but also bumpy) accomplished wishes of pro-European politicians across Europe. Unlike, for instance Macedonia, which got its candidate status only 18 months after Croatia. The Republic of Croatia is just preparing for the signing of the “Warsaw Treaty” and for the final step – national referendum coming probably on January/February 2012, whereas Macedonia is balancing between internal problems and unresolved external issues. Despite Croatia faced plenty of internal affairs, as well as external obstacles, due to harder requirements of the European Commission than ever before, it is entering the EU as a much stronger country then some current members. Croatian people anyway should prepare themselves for the fact that full and definite integration will take longer time than the period left until official accession in mid-2013. This is caused by the still dismal internal situation and especially unsuitable times in the contemporary EU. The European Union is currently more heterogeneous than ever before. The Hungarian presidency was not able to contribute to rectification of it and if the European Union is not weaker than a year ago, it is definitely not stronger as well (as was the Hungarian motto).

Into this state of affairs enters a country which has still not resolved border disputes with its neighbors. This new member with full of accession experiences must exactly help them with their own tough way into the EU at the same time. It could seem as an incomprehensible requirement. Anyway, the EU was established on the basis of common confidence and even though we are witnessing its deep undermining nowadays, it is necessary to work on its renewal, in the EU internally and on the other hand across its borders - externally. It means that Croatia should work on cross-border cooperation with all Western Balkans countries unconditionally. As was already mentioned above, the current enlargement of other countries could seem like an illusion now, but if the EU wants to be a more important player in the future it definitely should not close its doors for rest of candidate countries. Firstly, it would be a big European deception for the Western Balkans, because Brussels has already promised (by the Thessaloniki Agenda in 2003) future membership to all countries in this region. Secondly, it would be another failure of the EU in the short-term period. This implies the fact Croatia would become the most suitable country in the future enlargement process and should become a leader of it.

After the Eastern enlargement in 2004-2007, we can divide all new member countries into three categories. The first of them is a group of countries which endeavor for influence in the functioning of the EU. It is necessary to dispose sources, abilities and determination for this. Poland, maybe Lithuania, represent new member states which are trying to do that. Especially, the voice of Poland is extensively heard in Brussels, albeit not usually in a positive sense. The second group represents members which also endeavor for affairs in the EU, but unfortunately they do not have sufficient capacities available for creating important strategies and own goals. Hungary, for example, aspired to be in the first group, but after their action while heading the EU they belong supposedly here, commonly with Romania and Czech Republic. Although Hungary has well-educated and purposeful experts, what was confirmed by background reports from the Union, their politicians are busy in the long-term period (not only Orbán) by their internal issues and problems. The last group (Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia) represents that club which is led by Brussels without any lust for change, the so-called keeping of status quo in the EU. It is only left to the Croatian political representatives (current and future), as well as to ordinary people to determine what position Croatia will take. Politicians have to use understandable communication about future direction of the country towards citizens; otherwise ordinary people should turn to the civil society for useful and constructive influence in decision-making. Croatia is bogged down by irritating problems with deep corruption and citizens are disgusted by long negotiations with the EU. But it is really necessary to avoid all these negative circumstances and engage in a responsible position and prepare for the European future.

It is necessary to formulate short-term and long-term strategies for this. Basically, it works just like in companies with a well-working management, because the first strategy does not work without the second one and vice versa. The Republic of Croatia will be with its 4.5 million population a rather small country in the European family and that is why Croatia has to think cooperatively in terms of foreign policy. This is a reason why Croatia should find appropriate partners for common interests. Croatia could find an example in the Central Europe where the Visegrád Group is still in operation during this long-term strategy. Despite of the fact that mutual interests of these countries are in political opposition sometimes, as small and medium-sized countries (except Poland) they can make an effort of creating common European strategies and approaches. Croatia has already learnt this way of regional cooperation during its pre-accession period by e.g. CEFTA, which was finally transformed to the region of Western Balkans in 2006. Nevertheless, Croatia will join the EU as the only country from current CEFTA members. This basically means two responsibilities for Croatia, a new EU member state. Zagreb has to find those related countries that will help with definition of common interests. Historically and culturally it leads to make better common relations with, for example, Slovenia, but both countries have to avoid their disputes and extend their common past. Other countries such as Hungary, Austria and Italy are the most important partners in foreign trade and especially relations with Germany should be supported by additional cooperation. It is not going to be easy to find appropriate partners in the currently distrustful Europe, but here it begins - immediate work with plenty of small steps (short-term strategies) in the long-time period. The second duty is continuation of deep cooperation with the rest of the Western Balkans, because Croatia should definitely hold the flag of another enlargement of the EU, as was mentioned above.

Due to this, Croatia could become an important player in the enlargement policy (and even in foreign policy further) and determine the EU external direction in the coming years. Croatia has to avoid all problems, such as in te Bulgarian and Romanian cases of their inability to fight corruption and become a strong member of the EU among “new” countries in European family. “When Croatia joins the EU, it is going to be an important influx of optimism and confidence for the future of the EU” said Donald Tusk when he brought the draft of Accession Treaty to Zagreb in September. We should not lie to ourselves, because these words full of confidence seems like a dream in the current European Union. But at least we can believe that this loss of trust will be remedied and optimism will rise between ordinary people of Croatia, a member of the European Union.

Petr Fojtík
PhD candidate in Political Science
Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic

References

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Euroactiv (2009): Sweden admits Lisbon agenda failure, available at:
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Hrvatska gospodarska komora (2011): Gospodarska kretanja, available at: http://hgk.biznet.hr/hgk/fileovi/21847.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2011)

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http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2011/09/20/feature-02 (accessed on 8 October 2011)

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